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Abstract
The Minamata Convention, which entered into force on 16 August 2017, is a global, legally bind-
ing instrument on mercury. The initiative on the Minamata Convention was mainly driven by 
research showing negative effects on human health and the environment in the Arctic. The Arctic 
Council, an intergovernmental forum promoting cooperation on Arctic issues, and its Working 
Group, AMAP, played an important role in the process leading up to international negotiations 
on the Minamata Convention. This paper elucidates the evolutionary process in which scientific 
knowledge, herded by an intergovernmental, regional forum, is involved and forms the basis for a 
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cury issue and unravels the role that AMAP has played in this dynamic process.
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This paper explores the dynamic road towards the Minamata Convention through 
analyzing the role of the Arctic Council (AC), mainly through its working group 
the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP), as provider, broker and 
communicator of science related to the environmental problem of mercury. This first 
section introduces the problem of mercury in the Arctic and globally; the organiza-
tion of the AC and AMAP; and the background for the Minamata Convention. The 
second section explores the concept of science-policy interfaces more thoroughly and 
discusses the possible roles of scientific experts in these interfaces. This serves as a 
background for the third section which provides an in-depth and concise historical 
analysis of science, brokered by an intergovernmental forum, and the policy interfaces 
on the road towards adoption of the Minamata Convention on Mercury in 2013.
1. Introduction 
Mercury is a chemical of global concern.1 Long-range atmospheric transport, per-
sistence in the environment once anthropogenically introduced, the ability to bio-
accumulate in ecosystems and the significant negative effects on human health and 
the environment are the main reasons for this concern.2 Particularly in the Arctic, 
mercury is a severe environmental problem.3 As most of the mercury in the region is 
long-transported, international action is needed. 
In many Arctic organisms, levels of mercury concentrations are higher than else-
where. Most of the mercury that arrives in the Arctic is carried by the prevailing 
winds, ocean currents and rivers.4 Once the mercury reaches the Arctic, it spreads 
throughout the physical and biological systems that make up the Arctic environment. 
The rate and extent at which this happens is dependent on the different chemical 
forms in which mercury exists, the physical and chemical processes involving mer-
cury that dominate each system, and a wide range of climatic, geochemical, biologi-
cal and environmental factors.5 The 2008 Global Atmospheric Mercury Assessment 
by UNEP estimated that mercury levels in the Arctic air can on occasion be five to 
fifty times higher than levels measured in Europe and North America.6
Mercury has the ability to bioaccumulate and biomagnify in food webs. Living 
organisms readily take up mercury from their environment (either directly from air 
or water or by eating food containing mercury), with levels of mercury generally 
increasing with each step up the food chain. Typically, mercury levels are two to 
seven times higher at each successive step in a food chain.7 The ubiquity of mer-
cury in the Arctic ecosystem, the biomagnification in the food web and the potential 
effects on the organisms higher up in the food web, is a major challenge. Indigenous 
peoples are particularly vulnerable as they rely on subsistence hunting and fishing. 
Part of their traditional diet may contain high levels mercury and other contami-
nants, with potential interacting effects.8
Much of the scientific knowledge on the problem of mercury has been processed 
and communicated by the Arctic Council (AC) and its working group the Arctic 
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Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP). The AC is the leading intergovern-
mental forum promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arc-
tic States,9 Arctic indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants on common 
Arctic issues, in particular on issues of sustainable development and environmental 
protection in the Arctic.10 The AC consists of eight Arctic States members, as well as 
six organizations with Permanent Participant status representing Arctic indigenous 
peoples. The category of Permanent Participant was created to provide for active 
participation and full consultation with Arctic indigenous peoples within the Coun-
cil. Observer status in the AC is open to non-Arctic states, along with inter-govern-
mental, inter-parliamentary, global, regional and non-governmental organizations 
based on an AC consideration of willingness, suitability and capability based on 
certain criteria defined by the Council. 
The work of the AC is primarily carried out in six Working Groups, of which 
the Arctic Contaminants Action Program (ACAP) and AMAP have worked most 
actively on pollution issues. AMAP monitors the Arctic environment and human 
populations by synthesizing scientific research, and provides scientific advice to sup-
port governments on issues such as pollution and adverse effects of climate change. 
ACAP, on the other hand, was established to address the pollution issues and sources 
identified by AMAP. It is intended to act as a strengthening and supporting mecha-
nism to encourage national and international action to reduce emissions and releases 
of hazardous chemicals. 
Particularly AMAP has played a significant role in providing reliable and sufficient 
information on the status of, and threats to, the Arctic environment. By analyzing 
and synthesizing scientific data, and managing and coordinating research projects, 
this working group provides key scientific advice on the issue of mercury. This infor-
mation has been made available to governments both within and outside the AC, 
facilitating the identification and implementation of relevant action to prevent and 
remediate contamination. The scientific knowledge provided by AMAP has been an 
important driver for policy and legislation on mercury, both nationally and interna-
tionally, most importantly the Minamata Convention on Mercury. 
The Minamata Convention on Mercury is a global treaty to protect human health 
and the environment from the adverse effects of mercury. It was agreed at the fifth 
session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee on mercury in Geneva, 
Switzerland, on 19 January 2013, and adopted later that year on 10 October 2013 
at a Diplomatic Conference (Conference of Plenipotentiaries) held in Kumamoto, 
Japan. The Convention entered into force on 16 August 2017. 
The Convention draws attention to a global and ubiquitous metal that occurs 
naturally, has a broad range of uses in everyday objects and is released to the atmo-
sphere, soil and water from a variety of sources. Controlling the anthropogenic 
releases of mercury throughout its lifecycle has been a key factor in shaping the 
obligations under the Convention.11 The main objective of the Convention is to pro-
tect human health and the environment from anthropogenic emissions and releases 
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of mercury and mercury compounds, and it sets out a range of measures to meet 
this objective.12 These include measures to control the supply and trade of mercury, 
including setting limitations on certain specific sources of mercury such as primary 
mining, and to control mercury-added products and manufacturing processes in 
which mercury or mercury compounds are used, as well as artisanal and small-scale 
gold mining. The text of the Convention includes separate articles on emissions and 
releases of mercury, with controls directed at reducing levels of mercury while allow-
ing flexibility to accommodate national development plans.13 
Major highlights of the Minamata Convention include a ban on new mercury 
mines, the phase-out of existing ones, the phase-out and phase down of mercury 
use in a number of key products and processes, control measures on emissions to 
air and on releases to land and water, and regulation of the informal sector of artis-
anal and small-scale gold mining. The Convention also addresses interim storage of 
mercury and its disposal once it becomes waste, sites contaminated by mercury as 
well as health issues.14 Despite these major highlights, the Convention also contains 
a number of challenges. For example, the Convention leaves a considerable degree 
of flexibility to Parties with regard to mercury emissions and releases.15 Though the 
development and adoption of the Convention is undoubtedly a major achievement, 
it is still unclear to what extent the provisions of the Convention, will contribute to 
tackling the problem of mercury.16 However, the extent to which the design and sub-
stance of the Convention is sufficient in light of the severity and complexity of the 
mercury problem falls outside the scope of this paper.
Instead, this paper aims to shed light on the role of the AC and particularly the 
AMAP working group as a science broker on the road towards adoption of the 
Minamata Convention. The process of generating scientific knowledge and scientific 
advice on a particular environmental problem leading towards a global legally bind-
ing agreement is not a straightforward one. To a large extent the pathway towards 
the Minamata Convention has been shaped through important science-policy inter-
faces, where the AC and its working group AMAP have been heavily involved. Sci-
entific experts, linked to both AMAP as well as national delegations, have influenced 
the negotiating history and final text of the Minamata Convention.  In an effort to 
elucidate the role of the AC and particularly AMAP as a science broker on the road 
towards the Minamata Convention, this paper identifies and describes particular 
science-policy interfaces in the period between 1989 and 2013. 
2. Science-policy interfaces and the role of scientific experts 
The pathway from science to policy is not straightforward. One reason for this is the 
fact that science never operates in a vacuum; political considerations may, for instance, 
put weight on one part of the research findings, guide the establishment of research 
programs and determine the allocation of funding. Within the scientific community, 
there are often multiple views or controversies over issues. Moreover, stakeholders 
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outside the scientific community may not agree with the scientific advice given, and 
contest the scientific knowledge base. This could be the case if scientists recommend 
restrictions on commercial activities for political decision-making by setting limits for 
carbon emissions or other environmental pollutants, such as mercury.
Despite the potential complexity and dynamic nature of the pathway towards 
policy and law, it is generally acknowledged that science is an important source of 
authority in environmental policy, and that environmental policy should be based 
on sound scientific findings.17 According to Bocking 2004, science enables the map-
ping of biological diversity and ecosystem qualities, and can thereby identify the 
state of ecosystems. Through this mapping, scientists can define reference points 
through which changes in ecosystem functioning can be monitored and communi-
cated. As such, scientists play a central role in identifying emerging environmental 
hazards.18 Gluckman, however, questions how we can ensure the effective role of 
science in public policy-making. He argues that “[e]vidence is often contested and 
the policy responses are incremental at best. But policy-makers, too, are vexed by 
scientists’ ability to identify problems, yet frequent inability to place their work in the 
context of timely and feasible policy solutions”.19
More recently however, the role of scientific experts appears to have expanded 
from identifying environmental problems towards influencing the policy processes 
addressing these problems. In policy processes there is thus a growing reliance on 
experts, a process referred to as ‘expertisation’. Scientific experts, rather than polit-
ical and/or administrative staff, are increasingly involved in preparing policy nego-
tiations,20 though their degree of involvement may vary.21 Scholars have identified 
different categories of experts, including: the pure scientist, the science arbiter, the 
issue advocate, and the honest broker of policy alternatives.22
Spruijt et al explain that the pure scientist seeks to focus only on facts and does not 
interact with decision-makers. The science arbiter answers specific factual questions 
posed by decision-makers. The issue advocate goes further and seeks to reduce the 
range of choices available to decision-makers by promoting one specific solution. 
The honest broker of policy alternatives seeks to expand or at least clarify the range 
of choices available to decision-makers.23 There are thus different dimensions of 
science-policy interfaces, which generally can be defined as social processes which 
encompass relations between scientists and other actors in the policy process, and 
which allow for exchanges, co-evolution, and joint construction of knowledge with 
the aim of enriching decision-making.24
In a literature review on the subject of (factors that influence) the roles of sci-
entists when advising policy makers on complex issues, Spruijt et al conclude that 
research on expert roles has remained mostly theoretical, and they call for more 
empirical research. More knowledge on this issue may ultimately lead to an improved 
uptake of scientific information in policy processes and possibly to more effective 
and accepted policy measures.25 In an attempt to contribute to the need for more 
empirical research, this paper aims to unravel science-policy intersections and the 
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role of AMAP as a science broker on the road toward adoption of the Minamata 
Convention. 
3. The road to Minamata – AMAP as a science broker 
This section provides an analytical and historical overview of the science-policy 
interfaces leading toward adoption of the Minamata Convention in 2013. The over-
view covers the period 1989–2013. 
3.1 An Arctic forum with growing global reach (1989–2001)
In January 1989, the Finnish government reached out to the other Arctic states 
proposing a conference on the protection of the Arctic environment.26 Following 
discussions between the eight states, the Arctic Environmental Protection Strat-
egy (AEPS) was adopted in June 1991. This multi-lateral, non-binding agreement 
encompasses issues such as monitoring, assessment, conservation, protection, emer-
gency preparedness and response within the Arctic zone.27 As part of the strategy, 
it was decided to set up an Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP), 
a task force with a secretariat situated in Norway. AMAP was established to imple-
ment key elements of the AEPS by “providing reliable and sufficient information on 
the status of, and threats to, the Arctic environment, and providing scientific advice 
on actions to be taken in order to support Arctic governments in their efforts to take 
remedial and preventive actions relating to contaminants”.28
In 1996, through the Ottawa Declaration, the AEPS-countries formally established 
the Arctic Council (AC) as an intergovernmental forum for cooperation, coordination 
and interaction among the Arctic states.29 The forum included Arctic indigenous com-
munities and other Arctic inhabitants and focused on common Arctic issues, in partic-
ular on sustainable development and environmental protection in the region. AMAP, 
established five years earlier, was at the same time integrated as a working group under 
the AC, along with the groups: Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF); 
Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME); and Emergency Prevention, 
Preparedness and Response (EPPR).30 The first AMAP assessment report was pub-
lished in 1997 in a concise policy format “Arctic Pollution Issues: A State of the Arc-
tic Environment Report”. The following year, in 1998, a comprehensive, technical 
and fully-referenced scientific version of the same report “AMAP Assessment Report: 
Arctic Pollution Issues” was published.31 The report compiled existing knowledge on 
pollution in the Arctic, and contained a separate chapter on heavy metals, including 
mercury. It included several policy recommendations for the AC member states: 
• Reduce domestic emissions and releases 
• Complete the negotiations on the three protocols under the Convention on 
Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP Convention), including one 
on heavy metals 
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• Promote extension of the geographic area covered by LRTAP to include more 
than the European Monitoring and Evaluation Program (EMEP) area 
• Strongly support the work of the INC to prepare a legally binding global agree-
ment on POPs (later to become the Stockholm Convention) 
• Explore “other appropriate mechanisms” to address and control releases of heavy 
metals to the aquatic and terrestrial environment, including “other legal mecha-
nisms”. 
• Strive for implementation of all relevant agreements that aim at reducing pollu-
tion of the Arctic environment. 
The lack of a legal instrument on heavy metals targeting transboundary pollution 
from all relevant sources was becoming more and more evident. Hence, one con-
ceivable interpretation of these policy recommendations could be that “other legal 
mechanisms” was pointing at a global legislative measure that worked beyond current 
national and regional legislative frameworks, covering all relevant types of sources, 
emissions and releases, i.e. the early traces of a future Minamata Convention. 
According to AMAP, the information provided in the first assessment report 
(1997/1998), was an important contribution to the negotiation of the two protocols 
on persistent organic pollutants (POPs) and heavy metals, for the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe’s Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air 
Pollution.32 Besides, as an important source of information documenting contam-
inants transported long-range and accumulating in the Arctic, the information fed 
into the development of a global agreement on POPs, to be established in 2001 
(Stockholm Convention).
These reports were also the foundation for the decision of the AC to cooperate 
to make concrete pollution reductions within the region: hence a new working form 
was established. The Arctic Council Action Plan to Eliminate Pollution of the  Arctic 
(ACAP) was set up in 2000 to address sources that had been identified through 
AMAP.33
Following up on its first assessments of environmental pollution in the Arctic, 
the AC asked AMAP to sustain its activities and update the assessment on various 
issues, including heavy metals and mercury. Thus, in October 2002 AMAP pub-
lished its second assessment report (State of the Art), covering multiple pollution 
and health issues, including mercury. The report included policy recommendations 
stating that reducing exposure to mercury warrants regional and global action. Fur-
thermore, it underlined that Arctic concerns must be adequately addressed in any 
action “undertaken by UNEP and its possible proposals”.34
3.2  Legally binding or voluntary approach – the influence of the Arctic Council and 
AMAP (2001–2010)
During the period between 2001 and 2009, several key developments and initiatives 
took place that had a pivotal role for the development of what would later become 
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the Minamata Convention. The role of the AC – through its working group AMAP – 
changed noticeably during the period, from simply being a supplier of Arctic data 
and knowledge to being a key data supplier, coordinator and broker of scientific 
knowledge. 
This changing role of the AC is not merely evident in the context of mercury. In 
general, the AC and AMAP became much more active in this period through a focus 
on large scale scientific assessments. Koivurova, Kankaanpää and Stępién (2015) 
argue that “[t]he role that has gradually evolved as a core task of the Arctic Council 
is its work to increase knowledge about the circumpolar Arctic to influence both 
national and international policy-making. The valuable outcome is the wealth of sci-
ence-based information in various formats and the established capacity to compile it 
for different needs”.35  Through these large-scale scientific assessments, the AC could 
influence the evolution of regional and global international environmental policies 
and treaties. To illustrate, in the context of persistent organic pollutants (POPs), 
Arctic science has been imperative. The extensive ‘State of the Arctic Environment 
Report’ from 1997, defined POPs (in addition to mercury) as an environmental and 
human threat, ending up in the Arctic from southern industrial regions via prevailing 
northerly winds and ocean circulation. To address the POPs issue, some AC member 
states increasingly engaged to influence global levels of governance, through active 
development of assessments and collaborations with UNEP.36 Whether this was a 
consensus based strategy from the AC or more a result of the AMAP secretariat’s 
rather independent, proactive role, remains unclear. The AC thus joined forces to 
combat POPs at the regional and global levels, and data from AMAP continues 
to inform the global regime on these pollutants.37 In the context of POPs, Rottem 
(2017) illustrates how Arctic science has been important in the nomination of new 
POPs to the Stockholm Convention, and more particularly how Norway has acted as 
a green ambassador by contributing actively to the nomination process.38
Regarding mercury, Norway has taken a proactive role. Interestingly, the proac-
tive line of the AC was more consistent with the policies and interests of the Nordic 
AC member countries, than with those AC members that opposed a legally binding 
approach. Norway was one of two countries to propose a legally binding instru-
ment on mercury.39 This proposal was soon supported by the EU, where the other 
Nordic countries were particular supportive. Later even Russia joined in. The US 
and  Canada, on the other hand, opposed the proposal during this period. Were the 
concurring interests of the AC and the proactive Nordic AC-members simply coin-
cidental or rather a showcase of strategic and multilevel governance craftsmanship?
3.2.1 2001–2003
In 2001, the UNEP Governing Council (GC) requested that the Executive Director 
of UNEP should undertake a global mercury assessment (GC decision 21/5), to be 
presented to the GC at its 22nd session in 2003.40 Building on contributions from 
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Governments, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations and the pri-
vate sector, the report should encompass sources, environmental fate, health effects, 
prevention measures and control technologies. As part of the implementation of 
the GC decision, UNEP established a Global Mercury Assessment Working Group, 
consisting of members nominated by Governments, intergovernmental organiza-
tions and non-governmental organizations.
In December 2002, a few months after AMAP published its second report on haz-
ardous chemicals in the Arctic, UNEP published its first Global Mercury Assessment 
(GMA-02), a report that would play an essential role regarding the development of 
international cooperation on mercury.41 Although AMAP is not acknowledged as a 
direct contributor to the report, the assessment includes a vast number of references 
to AMAP reports, including the 1998 “Assessment report: Arctic Pollution Issues” 
and the 2000/2002 “AMAP report on issues of concern”,42 as well as several fig-
ures developed by AMAP.43 In addition, numerous scientific studies developed by 
researchers linked to AMAP, are cited in the assessment.44
At the subsequent GC meeting in Nairobi in February 2003, it was agreed that 
there was sufficient evidence of significant global adverse impacts posed by mer-
cury to warrant further international action.45 It was at this meeting that Norway 
and Switzerland, with the support of the EU, the African group and some Latin- 
American countries, proposed to start negotiating a legally binding instrument on 
mercury. However, agreement on such a mandate could not be met at the GC- 
meeting, and some delegates still called for more scientific work.
Speaking on behalf of Senior Arctic Officials of the AC, the Icelandic represen-
tative followed up the Arctic perspective addressed in the AMAP-reports by draw-
ing attention to Arctic indigenous peoples and their risk of exposure to mercury 
through diet and its potential effects on neuro-development.46 Hence, discussions 
on developing a global framework were kept warm and UNEP was requested to 
compile Governments’ views on future actions on mercury and present them at 
the GC’s 23rd session, for the purpose of deciding “on the possibility of developing 
a legally binding instrument, a non-legally binding instrument or other measures 
or actions.”47
3.2.2 2003–2009 
At the 23rd session of the UNEP GC meeting, held in Nairobi in 2005, UNEP was 
requested to further develop UNEPs mercury program by developing a report on 
supply, trade and demand. The objective behind the report was to improve knowl-
edge on use and sources, including products and processes, building on submissions 
from governments, the private sector and international organizations.48 Although the 
report, titled “Summary of supply, trade and demand information on mercury” con-
tains a few references to specific ACAP reports, AMAP was apparently not involved 
in preparing the report.49 It was concluded that an assessment of long-term action 
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measures was needed, such as a legally binding instrument or other collaborative 
frameworks, and should be prepared for the next session.50
At the following meeting, its 24th session in 2007, major steps were taken: the 
GC requested that UNEP make a global inventory of anthropogenic emissions of 
mercury to the atmosphere. The report was prepared in cooperation with the AMAP 
Secretariat, which coordinated compilation of the report.51 This move represented 
greater involvement by the AC in preparing key background data, not only as a bro-
ker of Arctic data, but now even contributing to global efforts to document the scale 
and character of the mercury problem. The Global Atmospheric Mercury Assess-
ment was finalized in December 2008, providing a more solid knowledge base on the 
global distribution and contribution of emissions sources.52
At the 24th session, it was also decided to establish an overarching framework for 
the Global Mercury Partnerships - a voluntary body, which would include members 
from governments, industry and civil society stakeholders, to address the mercury 
problem in key sectors on a global scale.53 Furthermore, it was also decided to estab-
lish an ad hoc open-ended working group (OEWG), consisting of governments and 
stakeholder representatives to consider options for enhanced voluntary measures 
and/or international legal instruments. 
The following two OEWG-meetings (2007 Bangkok, 2008 Nairobi) that were set 
up to assess measures to address the global mercury problem, carried out thorough 
discussions on voluntary versus legal measures on mercury.54 Substantial interses-
sional tasks were undertaken by the Secretariat in the interim period, to carefully 
analyze all aspects of the two alternative tracks. At its second meeting the dele-
gates agreed on one legally binding option and three voluntary options to be con-
sidered by the UNEP GC. At the GC meeting in Nairobi in February 2009, the GC 
somewhat surprisingly agreed to develop a legally binding agreement on mercury 
to reduce risks to human health and the environment. UNEP was requested to con-
vene one OEWG meeting in 2009 and to set up an Intergovernmental Negotiating 
Committee (INC) that would commence in 2010 and finalize the negotiations by 
GC-27 in 2013. 
Following up, a few months after the GC decision on a legally binding approach, 
AMAP released an important assessment. The report “Human Health in the Arctic” 
(June 2009) documented the presence of mercury and other pollutants in the Arctic 
and illuminated the risk of effects on human health, especially on fetuses and young 
children, even at low levels.55 The report came with an explicit recommendation 
from AMAP to support the development of a global agreement “to limit mercury 
emissions to complement regional and national efforts that reduce environmental 
levels and lower human exposure to mercury in the Arctic”.56 
Even though the decision to initiate negotiations had already been made 
( February), the report may have provided motivation for some of the delegates to 
complete negotiations and reach a high level of protection of human health and the 
environment. It is also probable that a draft report had been circulated among AC 
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member states some months prior to publication, which may have given some incen-
tive to countries such as the United States and Canada to support the agreement, 
countries that just a few months before had been opposed to a legally binding agree-
ment. It is however plausible that the political turn-around made by the US had a 
stronger influence on that decision than an additional contribution to the already 
quite significant knowledge base.57 
In sum, the limited involvement of AMAP in the early phases of the negotiations 
around international action on mercury (prior to 2003), is coherent with statements 
made by Norwegian government officials who chose to go directly to UNEP in 2003, 
when they proposed a legally binding approach; thus, avoiding the risk of a slow 
down by those countries favoring a voluntary approach (Canada, US and Russia). 
Given these different preferences among the Arctic states, it is surprising that AMAP 
in this critical phase of the international negotiations under the GC, could take on 
such a proactive role, not only as a broker of Arctic science, but also as the central 
facilitator and knowledge supplier to the UNEP assessment reports. Interestingly, as 
with its first assessment report, AMAP received funding from the Nordic Council of 
Ministers to carry out this support to UNEP,58 indicating that the Nordic countries 
to an increasing extent, intentionally or unintentionally, made use of several routes 
of influence in the development of key knowledge. 
3.3 What to regulate and how comprehensively? (2010–2013)
When the delegates met at the first International Negotiating Committee (INC) 
in Stockholm in 2010, they did so with a common understanding that the gravity 
of the mercury problem was sufficiently documented, and that the apparent way 
forward was a globally binding approach. Notwithstanding, delegates had diverg-
ing views on how such an instrument should be shaped, what areas it should cover 
and to which degree. In this regard, the different economic, technical and social 
capabilities among the countries would become one of the most complex issues to 
address.
Whereas scientific input during the 1990s and early 2000s focused on identifying 
and understanding the scale of the mercury problem, later studies and assessments 
increasingly focused on sources of emissions and releases. For instance, the UNEP/
AMAP 2008 report included a chapter on the geographic distribution of air emission 
sources, one chapter on types of sources (anthropogenic, natural and remobilization) 
and one on industrial sources.59 Similarly, the AMAP report on human health from 
2009 reviewed local sectoral sources of contaminants.60 Even though no agreement 
had been made at this point, the increasing focus on sources was not surprising, con-
sidering the fact that discussions on whether they should opt for a binding approach 
or not were coming closer to an end, and they were already addressing the details of 
what such an instrument would include. Within the UNECE-region and nationally 
in many countries, reduction measures had already been implemented over the last 
two-three decades, and there was substantial evidence to lean on. 
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Between 2010 and 2013 five INC meetings were arranged to develop an instru-
ment based on consensus between the negotiating countries. During this period 
there were three assessments; AMAP had its stamp on all of them: The “UNEP 
Paragraph 29 study”, the AMAP report “Mercury in the Arctic” and the UNEP 
“Global Mercury Assessment 2013”. 
As indicated above, already at the 25th GC meeting in February 2009, the Gov-
erning Council requested that UNEP carry out a study of mercury-emitting sources, 
including an assessment of costs and effectiveness of control technologies and mea-
sures.61 The purpose was to “inform” the work of the INC and provide relevant infor-
mation on appropriate control measures that could be featured in the instrument. 
The study was sponsored by the Nordic Council of Ministers and partly authored by 
AMAP-staff and researchers with close links to AMAP. Titled the “UNEP Paragraph 
29 study”, it became an important scientific document underpinning the impor-
tance of controlling key emitting sectors. In addition, the report was published at 
a critical stage. During the first meetings several important decisions were made 
on the structure and content of the convention. One of these decisions was which 
emission sources to air or product categories ought to be covered by the convention, 
another was whether to opt for a “negative” or a “positive” list of products. A “neg-
ative” list would imply that all use of all mercury-containing products is prohibited, 
unless explicitly exempted, whereas a positive list – which turned out to be the final 
decision – implies that all use is allowed, unless specifically banned. 
The AMAP report “Mercury in the Arctic”, published approximately a year later 
(2011) focused specifically on the challenges associated with mercury pollution in 
the Arctic. Besides emphasizing the need for more knowledge in the “policy-rele-
vant science recommendation”, the authors recommended that the AC continue to 
support the then on-going INC-process. The AMAP report is heavily cited in the 
AMAP/UNEP Global Mercury Assessment, published in June 2013 (GMA13). 
The GMA13 report was a deliverable at the request of the GC in 2009 to update 
the GMA report from 2008. However, since it was published five months after 
the INC had agreed on a convention text (January 2013), it probably had a lim-
ited impact on the development of the Convention.62 An important purpose of the 
GMA13 was thus to update the knowledge-base on mercury use, emissions and 
management, and possibly represent a baseline for future action. Furthermore, even 
though the Convention text had been adopted, the report was still relevant for fur-
ther work in the interim-period and the INC6 and INC7 meetings, where guidance 
documents, thresholds and other supporting material were to be developed.
4. Conclusion
This paper has shed light on the dynamic road towards the Minamata Convention 
through analyzing the role of AMAP, and the AC more generally, as a provider, broker 
and communicator of science related to the environmental problem of mercury. AMAP 
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has played a key role in the process leading up to international negotiations on the 
Minamata Convention. To explain the success behind this process, three issues should 
be highlighted: the role of experts, the importance of timing, and the issue of funding. 
Experts in AMAP had worked on the problem of mercury and its effects on human 
and environmental health for a long time before the adoption of the Minamata Con-
vention in 2013. This pool of expertise linked to AMAP resulted in comprehensive 
scientific reports that increased awareness among stakeholders and enhanced sci-
entific evidence on the adverse effects of mercury. Our analysis shows that AMAP 
researchers over the years and to an increasing extent have been involved in and con-
tributed to important UNEP reports and assessments on mercury. This cooperation 
between AMAP and UNEP enhanced the strength of scientific evidence, whereby 
the severity of the environmental issue and the urgency of drafting a global legal 
instrument were clearly reinforced. The existence of a sound scientific evidence base 
affected the international negotiating process positively as resources could be used 
on negotiating legal approaches to reduce the use and release of mercury, rather than 
on disputing the scientific aspects of mercury.
When assessing the influence of AC on the establishment of the Minamata Con-
vention, it is evident that good timing was a crucial factor in the science-policy 
interface. The acute nature of the environmental crisis gave a sense of urgency to 
the development of knowledge on which to base action.63 Important AMAP reports 
were released at important moments, increasing the weight of evidence on the prob-
lem of mercury, thus constructing the momentum and enhancing incentives for 
states to agree on the need to draft a legally binding instrument and to agree on 
different provisions of the Minamata Convention. The importance of good timing 
and the underlying intention to contribute to policy development is well illustrated 
by the release of the 1997 policy-format report ‘Arctic Pollution Issues: A State of 
the Arctic Environment’, one year before the release of its full technical and scien-
tific version. This kind of policy-oriented scientific advice has played a strategically 
important role in the process. Due to its well-timed and thorough scientific reports 
on mercury, AMAP became increasingly more involved in the process. Although 
Norway had been reluctant to go through the AC when initiating the Convention 
in 2003, arguing that several of its member states were opposed to legally binding 
measures, the AC was increasingly used as an instrument for policy development on 
the global arena. In 2007, at the 24th session, it was even decided that AMAP should 
coordinate the Global Atmospheric Mercury Assessment.
A final issue that should be highlighted is the significance of funding. An important 
factor affecting the intersection between science and policy is related to scientific 
orientation and funding. Not only does this impact on the topics science focuses on, 
but it also has an enormous effect on the way science proceeds and, to the extent that 
funding agencies stress the importance of dissemination, on the way scientific knowl-
edge diffuses into society in general and into policy processes in particular.64 On sev-
eral occasions, the Nordic Council of Ministers funded scientific research carried out 
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by AMAP and by researchers related to AMAP. The first AMAP assessment report 
(1997–1998) was sponsored by the Nordic Council of Ministers. AMAP also received 
funding from the Council to contribute to the 2009 report on ‘Human Health in the 
Arctic’. 
In conclusion, the Arctic Council, through AMAP, has been a crucial supplier, 
knowledge provider and broker in the establishment of the Minamata Convention. 
However, the extent to which this is the result of strategic planning from member 
states or the AMAP secretary – or rather the result of organic development in line 
with global policy development on mercury remains an open question. 
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